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A COMMENTARY:
WHY CIVIL COMMITMENT LAWS DON'T
WORK THE WAY THEY'RE SUPPOSED TO
PHILIP D. ARBEN
Central Michigan University
Department of Management and Law
It is often presumed that the legal rights of those who are mentally ill
or alleged to be mentally ill are adequately protected by the changes in
civil commitment statutes that most states instituted during the 1970s.
The author who participated in the writing of these reform statutes re-
cently observed 63 civil commitment hearings. The gap between the stated
requirements of the statute and the actual conduct of the commitment
hearings was substantial. This paper attempts to explain why the reality
has failed to meet the promise.
In the late 1960s and throughout the decade of the 1970s,
substantial changes in the civil commitment laws in the United
States were enacted. Prior to these changes a person could be
committed to a mental hospital simply upon the certification of a
physician that a person was mentally ill, and without benefit of
any meaningful judicial review or oversight. The new statutes
established a new and tougher standard of commitability-a
person had to be both mentally ill and as a result of'that mental
illness physically dangerous to themselves or others-and that
determination had to be made by a judge or jury only after a
judicial hearing that contained adequate due process procedures
and safeguards. Physical dangerousness is conceived of as either
direct physical injury to the person or others or as physical injury
resulting from an inability to attend to basic physical needs such
as food, clothing, and shelter.
Recently there has been some retrogression in a small number
of states where a lesser standard of "mentally ill and in need of
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treatment" has been added to the standard of mentally ill and
dangerous, but the stringent model developed during the 1960s
and 1970s stands as the legal format in the vast majority of states.
Thus civil commitment in most parts of the United States
requires that it be shown by clear and convincing evidence that
a person is both mentally ill and dangerous as a result, and
that determination is to be made at a judicial hearing in which
the person has the right to be present, to be represented by
counsel, to have at least one mental health professional who
is recommending commitment personally testify to secure an
independent psychiatric examination, and the right to present
and rebut evidence. Further, before a temporary or emergency
commitment can be accomplished (to be followed by a court
hearing in a stated number of days), a person must be certified
as meeting the commitment standard by either a physician or a
mental health professional as well as by a psychiatrist.
Considering these statutory requirements, one might be led
to believe that commitment hearings constitute fairly vigorous
judicial proceedings.The reality is quite different. The average
commitment hearing lasts only about 15 to 20 minutes and re-
sults in about 95 percent of the respondents being committed for
treatment either as an inpatient, outpatient, or some combination
of the two.
The author, who in the 1970s, participated in the writing of the
commitment laws in two large states-Michigan and Illinois-
recently researched the pertinent literature and subsequently
observed some 63 commitment hearings held in a variety of
jurisdictions within Michigan.Thus, while the following observa-
tions apply most directly to Michigan, all the available evidence
indicates that the process is more or less the same throughout the
United States. In fact, Michigan probably ranks above the majority
of states in attempting to safeguard the legal rights of those who
are mentally ill or alleged to be mentally ill.
Unfortunately, the only precise way to determine what per-
centage of people who go through commitment hearings in Michi-
gan actually are committed for in-patient or out-patient treatment
in any year would be to pull all of the appropriate court files in
each of Michigan's 83 counties. The task of going through several
thousand court records was beyond the scope of my investigation,
and to my knowledge has not been done in any other state. I
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consider the estimate of a 95 percent commitment rate to be a rea-
sonable perhaps even a conservative one. Of the 63 commitment
hearings I attended in three different jurisdictions representing
some ten counties, there were only two outright releases-a 97
percent commitment rate. In addition, an examination of the court
records for another and smaller county indicated that of the 18
commitment hearings held there in 1997, there were no releases.
Further, numerous conversations with presiding judges, partici-
pating prosecutors and defense attorneys, and court administra-
tive personnel supported this estimate-in fact some thought that
the figure was probably even higher. Finally, while the literature
from other states on commitment rates is eminently sparse, I have
found nothing that would indicate that the Michigan experience
is unusual.
Why is it that with most state commitment statutes fairly
rigorously drawn, the commitment process itself is so truncated
and the commitment rate so exceedingly high? Many different
forces and factors seem to be at work and are here set forth:
STATUTORY EROSION
First, as previously noted there has, in fact, been some erosion
in state statutes. For example, in 1995, the Michigan legislature
amended the Michigan Mental Health Code so that the person
who files the petition for commitment is not required to testify
at the hearing and consequently can avoid being questioned by
the respondent's (the patient's) attorney (1995 Mich. Acts 290).
In general, one can observe that there is a whole constellation of
interest groups (professional and self-described advocacy) who
seek to ease or dilute the requirements for commitment and who
represent influential or substantial constituencies. Against this
stand an ever-diminishing band of civil rights lawyers who have
either been financially declawed or whose attentions have been
refocused on newer and "hotter" areas of social concern plus
some few academics who have viewed the mental health system
and who consider constitutional rights of some importance.
PRESUMPTION OF MENTAL ILLNESS
Since before a commitment hearing can be held the patient
must have been certified as meeting the standard of commitment
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by a physician or mental health professional (variously defined)
and a psychiatrist (variously defined), there is almost a palpable
presumption in the courtroom that the respondent must in fact
be mentally ill and dangerous and which presumption appears
to infect the entire proceeding. Whatever merit there may be to
that presumption, the essential thrust of the reform movement
in civil commitments-contrary to previous law-was that such
a determination was to be made by a judge (or jury) and not
by physicians or mental health professionals who could offer
testimony (expert or otherwise), but no more.
ROLE OF COUNSEL
It is axiomatic that no statute is self-executing. In commit-
ment hearings the role of the respondent's counsel is crucial.
Unless counsel mounts a vigorous defense in accordance with
the expressed wishes of his or her client, the client will be over-
whelmed. The reasons why counsel seldom does so are intricate
and are related to the manner in which counsel is selected, the
fees received, what I regard as an often misplaced benevolence,
and, perhaps most importantly, an astonishing naivete' about the
nature of mental illness and psychiatric expertise.
In Michigan, counsel is selected from a rotating court roster,
on which any attorney can have his or her name placed, and for
which he or she is paid about $50 per commitment hearing. When
I speak of their astonishing naivete' concerning mental illness, I
am making reference (among other things) to the fact that almost
all of the lawyers I spoke to who were participating in com-
mitment hearings believed that a psychiatrist could establish a
diagnosis of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder (manic depression),
or clinical depression by means of some biological test such as
urine, blood, or spinal fluid analysis, or through genetic testing or
brain imaging. The scientific fact, of course, is that such diagnoses
are only subjective evaluations based on the patient's reported
history and the examiner's personal interpretation of what he
sees and hears.
DANGEROUSNESS
It is perhaps ironic that because the older laws only required
a finding of mental illness and the newer laws require a finding of
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both mental illness and dangerousness, that the issue of whether
someone is actually mentally ill will now usually receive less
attention than whether they are dangerous. In the 63 hearings
that I recently attended, not once did I hear a respondent's at-
torney challenge the diagnosis of the state's testifying clinician.
In fact, not once was the clinician forced to justify his diag-
nosis by reference to some benchmarked criteria. Since the re-
spondent's counsel was either unable or unwilling to deal with
psychiatric matters, his or her inquiry tended to focus on facts,
allegations, and issues related to whether the respondent should
or should not be considered dangerous to himself or others-and
subsequently to treatment dispositions-inpatient, outpatient, or
a combination.
INDEPENDENT PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION
If one has witnessed a criminal trial in which the defendant's
sanity is a matter of issue, you are apt to observe that the psy-
chiatric and psychological testimony offered by the state and the
defense can be at considerable variance both as to diagnosis and
prognosis. Consonant with that reality, contemporary commit-
ment statutes will often provide that a respondent has a right
to secure an independent psychiatric examination-and at state
expense if indigent.
The Michigan statute has such a provision, and yet in all
the hearings I observed, an independent examiner testified but
once. Subsequent inquiries to court administrative personnel in-
dicated that independent psychiatric examinations are utilized
in only about two percent of the hearings-which is more or less
consistent with the experience in other states (Van Duizend &
Zimmerman, 1984).
As to why the percentage is so low, a specific answer is elusive.
Probable factors include: counsel's or the patient's lack of knowl-
edge that such a provision exists, the low fee paid by the state to
an independent examiner, the probability that the examiner will
be chosen from the same facility that employs the state's testifying
clinician (and thus the possibility of a less than independent opin-
ion), subtle discouragement from the court to avoid incurring the
cost and lengthening the proceeding, the patient's disinclination
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to delay or postpone the hearing which might thereby result (par-
ticularly if he or she is already hospitalized), and finally counsel's
belief that an independent examination would simply confirm the
state's diagnosis.
With the exception of the last explanation, the absence of an
independent examination leads to an almost untenable situation.
The state produces a clinician who testifies that the respondent is
mentally ill.The respondent produces no opposing clinical tes-
timony, and the respondent's counsel-as previously noted-
almost never challenges the diagnosis of the state's clinician. Ergo.
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
In order for someone to be civilly committed in the United
States, it must be proved by at least "clear and convincing evi-
dence" that the person meets the criteria for commitment. This
standard of proof was enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1979 (Addington v. Texas), and had been the standard utilized in
the 1974 Michigan Mental Health Code. In the older commitment
statutes, it was not unusual for people to be committed based
on "a preponderance of the evidence," which is the common
standard utilized in civil proceedings. The criminal standard, of
course, is "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Of the three standards of proof, clear and convincing appears
to be the most subjective in application. It has been suggested that
a preponderance of the evidence should mean a 51 percent level
of proof, clear and convincing a 75 percent level of proof, and
beyond a reasonable doubt a 95 percent level of proof. It appears,
however, that it is intellectually and emotionally easier to intuit
a 51 percent level or a 95 percent level than it is a 75 percent
level. In fact, since clear and convincing is a relatively recent legal
construction, there is relatively little in case law or otherwise to
illuminate at what point the balance is tipped, and none that I
know of in Michigan.
Thus in observing commitment hearings it seemed clear that
the participants were applying different levels of proof-certainty
under the rubric of clear and convincing evidence and further
that levels seemed to vary from court to court.
My own impression, and it is definitionally a personal one,
is that judges were deciding cases much closer to a standard
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of preponderance of evidence than to a standard of clear and
convincing evidence. In fact, my own conclusion was that in less
than one-third of the cases was it made clear and convincing to
me that the respondent met the standard of commitment. This
observation is made not to point a finger but to suggest that the
standard of clear and convincing permits too wide an area of
discretion and in application tends to pivot to a lesser standard of
proof rather than to a more rigorous one-or at least so it seems in
commitment hearings. What is obviously needed, as difficult as
it may be to construct, is some legislative or judicial articulation
that provides more specific guidance as to the weight and fulcrum
of evidence that applies.
DEFINITION OF MENTAL ILLNESS
As noted, the commitment standard requires a finding of both
mental illness and dangerousness as a result of that illness. How
is the fact of mental illness legally established? Again, as noted,
the state's testifying clinician, most often stipulated as an expert
witness, will offer his or her diagnosis usually in a conclusive
fashion (the patient is suffering from a bipolar disorder); the
respondent's attorney will neither challenge the diagnosis nor
require the clinician to specify the signs that led to that diagnosis.
The prosecutor will then ask the clinician whether in his or her
opinion the respondent's illness falls within the definition of men-
tal illness as set forth in the statute. The answer is invariably "yes."
Obviously defining mental illness in a generic sense is no sim-
ple task.The American Psychiatric Association's official definition
(mental disorder) consists of 148 words that first appeared in its
1990 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual III and has been repeated
in DSM III R and DSM IV.This definition presumably applies to
the 300 or so syndromes listed in DSM IV.
The author examined the statutory definition of mental illness
or mental disorder as contained in each of the 50 state civil com-
mitment statutes.Aside from California which has no statutory
definition (nor did Michigan until one was added to the 1974
Mental Health Code by a subsequent amendment), the definitions
consist of one or two sentences.
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About one-quarter of the states define the term either tau-
tologically(A mentally ill person is someone who suffers from
a psychiatric disorder) or by combining the two prongs of the
commitment standard (A mentally ill person is someone who
is mentally ill and dangerous to themselves or others). Another
quarter define mental illness in functional terms (Mental illness
is a mental disorder that results in adverse effects on a person's
ability to function).
Approximately 50 percent of the states employ a definition
that replicates or appears to be derived from a definition pro-
mulgated by the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health in
1970, when that state's civil commitment statute was rewritten.
The wording then and now is: "Mental illness means a substantial
disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory
which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize
reality or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life."
The derivative Michigan definition contained in its commit-
ment statute is "' Mental illness' means a substantial disorder of
thought or mood that significantly impairs judgment, behavior,
capacity to recognize reality, or ability. to cope with the ordinary
demands of life."
Two points deserve comment concerning the Michigan defin-
ition-and by extension the other 25 states employing a similar
definition.
First, not once in any of the hearings that I attended was the
issue raised by either the respondent's counsel or the court as
to whether the alleged mental illness was indeed "substantial"
or one that resulted in a "significant" impairment. Nor was the
issue specifically addressed by the state other than by asking, pro
forma, the state's clinician as to whether the respondent's illness
met the statutory definition of mental illness.
Second, if the modifiers substantial and significant are implic-
itly or explicitly removed from the definition, what remains is a
statement so inclusive as to imperil us all. Thus literally read, the
definition would define me as mentally ill if I had a disorder of
mood that impaired my judgment or behavior. I must say this
happens to me at least once a month.
It was stated previously that the original draft of the Michigan
Mental Health Code (and the Illinois Code) chose not to define the
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term mental illness. It was felt by its authors that in the absence
of a definition, the parties in a commitment hearing would be
forced to examine more concretely and critically the substance of
such an allegation. To my knowledge, California is the only state
that does not have such a definition, but I have been unable to
uncover any material that has examined that singular approach
and its consequences. But surely the definitions of mental illness
by which people are committed in the United States should give
us all some pause.
JUDICIAL CAUTION
Most judges who preside over commitment hearings have to
stand for reelection from time to time. Thus, it should not be sur-
prising if judges would seek to avoid situations where someone
they had decided should not be committed then proceeded to
inflict serious physical harm on themselves or even more dra-
matically on others. This would seem to lead to a bias (although
some would deny it) for commitment, for however short a period
of time, and a transfer of the release decision to a mental health
professional who is not as publicly visible and who does not have
to run for elective office. This bias or tendency seems to be actively
reinforced by a general public perception, strongly advanced
by some mental health professional and advocacy groups, that
mental illness is biologically based (whatever that means) or a
biologically caused illness, although the evidence to support a
biological etiology (except in clear organic situations) is far from
persuasive (Valenstein, 1998). But judges are first human beings
with careers and other obligations to consider, and it should not
be surprising if they tended to play it safe rather than to adhere
to the strict letter of the law, particularly in an area so loaded with
uncertainties.
CONCLUSION
It was more than two hundred years ago that Sir William
Blackstone, a prime molder of Anglo-American jurisprudence,
offered the criminal law maxim that "It is better that ten guilty per-
sons escape than that one innocent suffer" (Commentaries, 1769).
When it comes to civil commitment, which the U.S. Supreme
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Court in 1972 defined as a "massive curtailment of liberty" (Hum-
phrey v. Cady), and which the Court has consistently reiterated,
most recently in Kansas v. Hendricks (1997), we seem to prefer a
much less rigorous standard.
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